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LIMITING POPULATION GROWTH IN FLORIDA AND
THE NATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER*

and K.

LAWRENCE GRAGG*0

A recent poll of Florida voters revealed that the most common concerns of
Floridians are whether the population growth of the state should be limited
and, if so, how such a policy should be formulated and effectuated." This
concern with growth is not surprising. During the three decades from 1940 to
1970 Florida's population increased by a whopping 258 per cent - nearly five
times the national average. 2 The population boom is continuing into the
seventies with a projected compound annual growth rate of 4.2 per cent,' compared to a national figure of 1.1 per cent,4 and the predicted population of
Florida for 1980 has recently been revised upward from 8.7 to 9.4 million' with
an estimated 14 million inhabitants by the year 2000.0 The uneven distribution of Florida's population further complicates the problem.7
The recent enactment by the municipality of Boca Raton, Florida, of a
"population cap"" has served to highlight the growing legal controversy over
the validity of the various growth control measures already taken or being
contemplated by local governments in response to Florida's population boom.
The Boca Raton "cap" attacks the growth problem directly and drastically by
simply limiting to 40,000 the total number of dwelling units that can be constructed within the municipal boundaries. 9 Other local governments in Florida
*Professor of Law and Director of the Institute for Cuban American Lawyers, University
of Florida.
**Instructor of Law, University of Florida.
1. See Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, May 5, 1974, at 5, col. 4.
2.

See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,

CENSUS OF POPULATION

1970

(1971). The population

of the United States increased from some 132 million to 203 million during the 1940-1970
period, whereas Florida's population increased from 1,897,414 to 6,789, 443 during the same
period. Id. at 11-7. Florida's rate of growth can be compared to a 189% population increase
in California, a 19% increase in Pennsylvania, and an actual decrease in the number of inhabitants of Arkansas, West Virginia, and North Dakota during the same time span. J. Burns
& M. James, Migration Into Florida 1-2 (prepublication draft, Work Paper No. 4, Division
of Planning and Analysis, University of Florida, Oct. 10, 1973).
3. The estimates indicate a jump of some 588,000 residents between July 1, 1970, and
July 1, 1972, which amounts to a 4.2% compound growth rate. See FLA. BUREAU OF EcoNOMIC AND BUSINESS RESEARCH, FLORIDA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 25 (1973).
4.

U.S. COMMISSION ON POPULATION

GROWTH AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE,

POPULATION

AND

THE AMERICAN FUTURE 17 (1972).

5. Burns &James, suzpra note 2, at 154.
6.

FLA. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC & BUSINESS RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 25.

7. Seven counties (Broward, Dade, Duval, Hillsborough, Orange, Palm Beach, and
Pinellas) contain more than 60% of the state's residents although they comprise less than
16% of the state's land area. Burns & James, supra note 2, at 127. The combined population
of these seven counties is larger than that of thirty-five of the fifty states. Id.
8. Boca Raton, Fla., Ordinance 1733, Oct. 3, 1972. Boca Raton, Fla., Resolution No.
109-72, Nov. 8, 1972.
9. The charger amendment reads: "The total number of dwelling units within the existing boundaries of the city is hereby limited to 40,000. No building permit shall be issued
[758]
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have responded less dramatically but with equal enthusiasm by imposing land
use or impact fees for the issuance of building permits, 0 by lowering dwelling
unit maximum densities,11 by declaring building moratoriums, 2 and by enacting optimum population and growth plans designed to discourage rural
development.' 3
Florida's local governmental units are by no means alone in their response
to population pressures. Comparable growth limitation plans have been enacted in other jurisdictions. Nearly all population growth limitation schemes
in Florida and the nation, however, have been or are being subjected to attack through litigation or otherwise on the basis that they violate or unduly
restrict state and federal constitutional principles or guarantees.' 4 This article
will discuss the constitutional principles allegedly violated by population
growth control measures of all types. The first to be examined are the particular and somewhat peculiar Florida constitutional doctrines regarding
municipal power and home rule. Next, the nationally applicable concepts of
substantive due process, equal protection, right to travel, and the taking of
property without compensation will be considered.
MUNICIPAL PowERs AND HOME RULE

The Florida ConstitutionalExperience
The first constitutional issue that must be considered regarding the validity
of growth control measures enacted by Florida local governmental units is that
of home rule powers.
The general theory of the relationship between state and local government
in American constitutional law is that in the absence of express constitutional
limitations, the power of the legislature over municipal corporations is plenary.' 5 Thus, the Florida Legislature under the 1885 constitution possessed all

for the construction of any dwelling unit within the city which would permit the total

number of dwelling units within the city to exceed 40,000." Id. Boca Raton's population
increased from 6,961 in 1960. to 28,506 in 1970, a 309% increase. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
supra note 2 ,at 11-24.
10. Broward County, Fla., Ordinance No. 73-2 (1973). See also FT. LAUDERDALE, FLA.,
CODE §48-29 (1973).
11. See generally Local Government Action To Control Present and Future Growth in
Florida, I FLA. ENVIRONMENTAL & URBAN ISSUES No. 4, at 10 (1974). Cf. Mailman Dev. Corp.

v. City of Hollywood, 286 So. 2d 614 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
12. Dade County recently imposed a four-month building moratorium on 250 square miles
of the county. St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times, Jan. 24, 1974, §B at 1, col. 5.
13.

See A

To ENCOURAGE
Nov. 7, 1972.

POLICY

COUNTY, FLORIDA,

OPTIMUM POPULATION AND URBAN GROWTH IN MANATEE

14. See, e.g., Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal.
1974); Golden v. Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal
dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
15. Municipal corporations have consistently been refused protection against the state
legislature under the Federal Constitution by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1932); see 2 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CoaRo-
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legislative power except that prohibited by the federal or state constitution,26
municipalities in Florida having no inherent power. 17 The legislature was empowered to charter municipalities and to amend or revoke the charter at any
time. ' This legislative supremacy over municipal affairs was strengthened by
the adoption of three rules by the Florida supreme court. First, the municipal
charter was declared the organic law of the municipality and thus the source
of all its power.' 9 Second, the court adopted Dillon's Rule, 20 which allows
municipalities only such powers as are expressly granted, or as are necessarily
implied from express grants.21 Finally, grants of municipal powers were required to be strictly construed with all doubts resolved against the municipality. 22

These rules and their counterparts in other jurisdictions drew heavy criticism from legal commentators and municipal associations,23 which lead to the
evolution of a new concept called "home rule," providing for a distribution of
power between state and local government. 24 Depending upon the asserted
source of home rule power, three main categories of implementation have

§4.03 (3d ed. rev. 1966). This position has also been recognized by the Florida
supreme court. State v. City of Boca Raton, 172 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1965); Gate City Garage,
Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 66 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1953).
16. The most pervasive of the limitations upon the power of the legislature under the
1885 constitution was article III, §20, which prohibited the enactment of special or local
laws in a number of enumerated cases. However, prohibitions of special or local laws relating
to municipalities were noticeably absent. FLA. CONsT. art. III, §20 (1885). An amendment to
article III, §24, adopted in 1934, had great potential for the development of municipal government in Florida. It provided in part: "[No special or local laws incorporating cities or
towns, providing for their government, jurisdiction, powers, duties and privileges shall be
passed by the Legislature." Fla. Laws 1933, S.J. Res. 582, at 881. The intended effect of this
amendment, however, was nullified by a supreme court decision holding that the prohibitions
were not self-executing and, as the legislature had not acted, the section was inoperative.
State ex rel. Matthews v. Alsop, 120 Fla. 628, 163 So. 80 (1935). See also Sparkman, The History and Status of Local Government Power in Florida, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 271, 277-78 (1973).
17. Cobo v. O'Bryant, 116 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1959).
RATIONS

18.

FLA. CONsT.

art. VIII, §8 (1885).

19. Clark v. North Bay Village, 54 So. 2d 240, 242 (Fla. 1951).
20. 1 J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §237 (5th ed.
1911). The author states: "It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal
corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers and no others: First, those granted
in express words; second, those necessarily implied in or incident to the powers expressly
granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes
of the corporation, - not simply convenient, but indispensible."
21. See, e.g., Malone v. City of Quincy, 66 Fla. 52, 56-57, 62 So. 922, 924 (1913).
22. See, e.g., Liberis v. Harper, 89 Fla. 477, 104 So. 853 (1925).
23. See Sandalow, The Limts of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the
Courts, 48 MINN. L. REv. 643, 652-53 (1964). See also Comment, Municipal Powers in Florida:
By ConstitutionalRight or Legislative Grace?, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 597, 598 (1973).
24. The term "home rule" is susceptible of a variety of meanings. This results from the
dual roles, as political symbol and legal doctrine, it serves. As a political symbol, home rule
describes a state of autonomy that allows the local government to pursue self-determined
goals without legislative interference. As a legal doctrine, it is simply a grant of power to a
local governmental unit. See Sandalow, supra note 23, at 644-45.
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emerged.25 The strongest is self-executing constitutional home rule in which
the grant of municipal initiative flows directly from the state constitution.26 In
the second type, non-self-executing home rule, the grant of power is statutory
with the constitutional provision merely authorizing the legislature to pass
enabling legislation.2 7 The weakest form is legislative home rule, which is
28
based solely on a statutory grant.
Although the modern constitutional home rule movement dates from an
1875 amendment to the Missouri constitution,29 Florida did not follow the
trend until the ratification of a revised constitution on November 5, 1968.30
The revised constitution provides for home rule from two directions: by
granting power to local governments3 and by restricting the power of the
legislature.3 2 The heart of municipal home rule is found in article VIII, section
33
2(b) of the present Florida constitution, which provides in part:
Municipalities shall have governmental, corporate and proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions and render municipal services, and may exercise any
power for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law.
This constitutional grant is considered self-executing,34 but it remains subject
to legislative supremacy 35 by way of special 36 or general law.

25. Professor Sandalow suggests "a more useful classification would divide the categories
according to the terms of the grant, whatever its source." Id. at 670.
26. Sparkman, supra note 16, at 283-84.
27. This form is usally a compromise resulting from judicial invalidation of legislative
home rule as an unconstitutional delegation of power, local demand for a degree of autonomy,
and legislative reluctance to acquiesce in self-executing proposals. It is, then, little different
from constitutionally authorized legislative home rule. Id. at 284.
28. This type of home rule is extremely vulnerable to attack as an unconstitutional
delegation of power. State ex rel. Brown v. Emerson, 126 Fla. 576, 171 So. 663 (1936). It is
also subject to being withdrawn by subsequent legislative act. Vanlandingham, Municipal
Home Rule in the United States, 10 Vm. &MARY L. RIv. 269, 276 (1968).
29.

Mo. CoNsr. art. VI, §§19, 31 (1875).

30. Prior to the 1968 constitution two changes in the direction of home rule were made.
A 1915 law granted to cities the limited power to modify local government structures, election procedures, and mode of exercise of existing powers. Fla. Laws 1915, ch. 6940, §§1-15, at
312, §312.18. By far the most important move toward home rule was the 1955 adoption of an
amendment to the 1885 constitution authorizing the electors of Dade County to "adopt, revise, and amend from time to time a home rule charter government for Dade County." FLA.
CONsr.art. VIII, §11 (1885), as amended, 1956.
31. FLA. CONsr. art. VIII, §§l(f), (g), 2(b). These subsections apply to noncharter
counties, charter counties, and municipalities respectively.
32. FLA. Co Nsr. art. III, §§10, 11. Section 10 is derived from article III, §21, of the 1885
constitution and preserves the notice referendum requirement for special laws. Section 11
lists the subject matter prohibitions for special laws and is primarily a derivation of article
III, §20, of the 1885 constitution.
33. FLA. CONSr. art. VIII, §2(b).
34. See Sparkman, supra note 16, at 290.
35. Where the legislature retains the ultimate authority to determine the scope of home
rule powers it has been subjected to the same criticism as legislative home rule. "To the
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Although it was generally agreed that the intent of the constitutional provisions was to secure broad home rule powers for municipalities, the question
remained whether this had actually been accomplished in the face of continued
legislative supremacy. 37 In this light, the Florida Legislature in 1969 sought to
clarify both the scope of home rule powers and the extent to which the legislature exercise its prerogative to limit such powers.3 8 In one important law enacted in that session39 the legislature expressed a desire to broaden the scope
40
of home rule powers by providing:
The provisions of this section shall be so construed as to secure for
municipalities the broad exercise of home rule powers granted by the
constitution.
This expansive attitude was also conspicuous in the 1971 legislative session, in
which a broad county home rule bill was passed, 41 as was a bill repealing al-

extent that the legislature retains unlimited or virtually unlimited authority to supersede
an exercise of municipal initiative conferred by the constitution, there is only a semantic
difference between constitutional and legislative home rule, at least when the latter is defined in broad terms." Sandalow, supra note 23, at 699 n.12.
36. This is an additional limitation on municipalities and should be contrasted with the
grant of power to charter counties, which provides: "Counties operating under county charters
shall have all powers of local self-government not inconsistent with general law, or with
special law approved by vote of the electors." FLA. CONST. art. XIII, §1(g) (emphasis added).
37. Sparkman, supra note 16, at 292. The state of affairs was aptly outlined by the
counsel to the Florida League of Municipalities. "[I1t appear[s] that if municipalities wished
to exercise any power for municipal purposes where there was already a law on the books
relating to the subject, it could only be exercised in the restricted manner provided, and
since there was so much existing law, both general and special, relating to municipal powers,
there would be little that municipalities could accomplish under the constitutional grant of
home rule powers." Id. at 294.
88. See FLA. STAT. §§125.60-.64 (1973) (general law procedures for adoption of county
charters); FLA. STAT. §§125.66-.68 (1973) (procedures for the enactment of county ordinances);
Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-33, §1 (repealed 1978) (home rule powers for municipalities); Fla.
Laws 1969, ch. 69-242, §1 (repealed 1973) (general law delegating the authority to promulgate charter amendments to the municipal governing body).
39. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-3, §1 (repealed 1973). This statute was primarily a restatement of FLA. CONsT. art. VIII, §2(b), except that in the statute the limitation of home rule
powers by state legislative action was altered to read "except when prohibited by special or
general law."
40. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-33, §1 (repealed 1973). This provision was also not contained
in FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §2(b). See note 39 supra.
The statute was interpreted as follows by the counsel to the Florida League of Municipalities:
"The purpose of the statute was to delineate and clarify the constitutional municipal
authority which the legislature did not desire to restrict, but which under the constitution
it had the power to restrict . ..
"Unless a general law, a charter provision or a speical act contains language that clearly
and definitely states that a certain municipal power shall not be exercised, then a municipality may validly exercise any such power for municipal purposes."
Sparkman, supra note 16, at 296.
41. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-14. This bill was significant in two respects. It was "the first
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most all of the existing population acts42 and discouraging their future use.43
Neither the constitutional provision nor the legislature's strong policy
statements and actions have received subsequent judicial recognition. In City
of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc. 44 the leading case construing post1968 municipal home rule powers, the Florida supreme court invalidated a
municipal rent control ordinance. 45 In so holding the court noted the new constitutional provision on municipal home rule, but stated that it did not alter
the rule that the paramount law of a municipality is its charter, which gives it
all the powers it possesses. 40 The court then resurrected Dillon's Rule, relying
on a 1925 case 47 that required specific delegation of powers and resolved doubts
against the city.48 The court also asserted that: (1) the ordinance conflicted
with the Florida statute dealing with landlord-tenant relationships; 4 9 and (2)
rent control is a matter of statewide, not municipal concern. 50

act of home rule implementing legislation to address itself to the elimination of preexisting
detailed authorizing legislation, passed under earlier philosophies, that could be restrictive
under the constitutional limitations on home rule." Sparkman, supra note 16, at 298. Second,
the statute draws no distinction between charter and noncharter counties, indicating a
legislative intent to provide he fullest possible extent of home rule powers for all counties.
The law has been described as "in fact and intent, a legislative charter for a non-charter
county." Id.
42. Population acts are a form of general laws of local application that use population
as the basis of classification. General laws of local application were described by the Florida
supreme court as "relating to subdivisions of the state or to subjects or to persons or things.
as a class based upon proper distinctions and differences that inhere in or are peculiar or
appropriate to the class." State ex rel. Buford v. Daniel, 87 Fla. 270, 287, 99 So. 804, 809

(924).
43. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-29. The population act had been one of the most commonly
used methods of legislative control over local affairs and the effect of their repeal was to
broaden home rule powers.
44. 261 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1972).
45. Id. The case was decided on five grounds, three of which are discussed in the text
accompanying notes 46-50 infra. In addition, the court invalidated the ordinance because (1)
there was no emergency in fact and (2) the ordinance was too vague to be constitutional as
a delegation of powers.
46. 261 So. 2d at 803.
47. Liberis v. Harper, 89 Fla. 477, 104 So. 853 (1925).
48. 261 So. 2d at 803. This course of action has been criticized as "directly contrary to
both the spirit of the constitution and the trend in other jurisdictions." Comment, supra
note 23, at 601.
49. Fla. Stat. §§83.01 et seq. (1971). This concern, though not expressly so labeled, is
the preemption doctrine, which invalidates municipal legislation "not upon a determination
that the municipality has no interest or insufficient interest to regulate the matter, but upon
the ground that the legislature has determined that the state has a greater interest or that it
is a more appropriate forum than the city council for resolving the problems dealt with by
the regulation." Sandalow, supra note 23, at 665-66. See generally Glander 8&Dewey, Municipal
Taxation: A Study of the Pre-emption Doctrine,9 OHIO ST. L.J. 72 (1948).
50. 261 So. 2d at 804. Numerous cases have invalidated municipal ordinances on the
ground thit th6- subject natter"was not one of local or municipal concern, and therefore
was beyond the scope of the powers granted to municipalities. See, e.g., Kansas City v. J.1.
Case Threshing Mach. Co., 337 Mo. 913, 87 S.W.2d 195 (1935); Niehaus v. State ex rel.
Bd.of Educ., 111 Ohio St. 47, 144 N.E. 433 (1924); City of Madison v. Tolzmann, 7 Wis. 2d
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The Fleetwood Hotel court's reliance on case law repugnant to the 1968
constitution and statutory policy5 ' appears to have provoked legislative re5 2
sponse in the form of a comprehensive Municipal Home Rule Powers Act.
This Act, expressly intended "to remove any limitations judicially imposed
53
expands the constitutional grant by
... on the exercise of home rule powers"
giving municipalities authority to "exercise any power for municipal purposes,
except when expressly prohibited by law."5 4 Thus, the capacity for judicial
policymaking in the area of determining the propriety of municipal action 5
is severely restricted,5 6 if not nullified. The extremely broad definition of
"municipal purposes,"5 7 plus the recognition that municipalities "have the
power to enact any legislation concerning any subject matter upon which the
state legislature may act"5 " appears to preclude judicial invalidation on the
grounds that the subject of the legislation is of state-wide concern. In addition,
preemption by legislation or constitutional provision as a basis for invalidation
is narrowed considerably by the requirement that such conflicting authority
must expressly prohibit a municipality from exercising a given power.59
A recent opinion of the attorney general stated that the effect of the
Municipal Home Rule Powers Act would be to allow municipalities to pass
rent control ordinances and that the Fleetwood decision would no longer be
controlling.6° The opinion stated: 6 '
570, 97 N.W.2d 513 (1959). Though both have been used as the sole ground for invalidating
ordinances, a distinction should be made between invalidation because the subject matter is
not one of local or municipal concern and a subject being preempted by state law. For examples of the latter, see Firestone v. City of Cambridge, 113 Ohio St. 57, 148 N.E. 470 (1925);
City of Cincinnati v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 112 Ohio St. 493, 147 N.E. 806 (1925).
51. See text accompanying notes 37-48 supra.
52. FLA. STAT. §§166.011 et seq. (1973).
53. FLA. STAT. §166.021(1) (1973). Compare this, with "excepted as otherwise provided
by law" in article VIII, §2(b), and "except when prohibited by general or special law"
language of Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-33, §1.
54. FLA. STAT. §166.021(4) (1973).
55. Efforts have been made nationally to extinguish or at least to narrow considerably
the role of the judiciary. The National Municipal League's Model State Constitttion would
authorize a municipality "to exercise any legislative power or perform any function." See
NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION 97 (6th ed. 1963). But see Sandalow,
supra note 23, at 685-721.
56. See Ops. ATr'Y GEN. FLA. 073-267 (1973).
57. FLA. STAT. §§166.021(2) (1973) states: "Municipal purpose means any activity or
power which may be exercised by the state or its political subdivisions." (Emphasis added.)
58. FLA. STAT. §§166.021(3)(a)-(d) (1973).
59. FLA. STAT. §§166.021(l)-(4) (1973). By listing the four subject matters upon which
municipalities may not act, the legislature makes it difficult for courts to find other matter
impliedly precluded by vague constitutional language. The subject matter excepted is: "(a)
The subjects of annexation, merger and exercise of extra-territorial power, which require
general or special law pursuant to article VIII, section 2(c) of the state constitution; (b) Any
matter expressly prohibited by the constitution; (c) Any subject expressly preempted to
state or county government by the constitution or by general law; and (d) Any subject preempted to a county pursuant to a county charter adopted under the authority of §§l(g), 3,
and 6(e), article VIII, of the state constitution." Id.
60. O'. ATr'Y GEN. FLA. 073-267 (1973).
61. Id. at 7.
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[T]he Municipal Home Rule Powers Act, grants to municipalities all
power... exercisable by the state with the exception of areas expressly
forbidden by the Constitution, general law, county charter, or certain
special laws.
Therefore, it would seem that the Florida supreme court's "overkill" in the
Fleetwood decision has resulted in an undesirable situation. As one commentator analyzing a grant of power similar to the Florida Municipal Home
2
Rule Powers Act6 noted:63
[R]eliance is placed exclusively upon the legislature to curb possible
abuses of municipal power. A court could not limit municipal power
without limiting the power of the legislature even though the considerations relevant to a determination of whether the limitations should be
imposed may be quite different in the two situations. [I]t tend[s] to
force the courts to the adjudication of major constitutional questions limitations on legislative power - rather than permitting decision of
minor constitutional questions - limitations on municipal power which minimize the extent of judicial circumscription of legislatve
power.
Thus, applying the present resolution of the long dispute in Florida over
"home rule power" to present attempts by local governments to control population growth, one can conclude with at least some degree of confidence that
such attempts are no longer vulnerable to attack on the theory that they constitute the exercise of powers in excess of those possessed by local governmental
units. While this may be pleasing to those who support local growth control
actions, consideration should be given to the possibility that state control is
more appropriate and effective.
Treatment of Home Rule in Other States
Although the Florida situation is somewhat unique, constitutional home
rule municipalities in other jurisdictions will encounter similar problems depending on the wording of specific constitutional grants. In jurisdictions such
as Georgia, where the constitution vests the state legislature with discretion to
determine the quantity of home rule to be delegated, 64 a municipality's power
to enact a growth control ordinance depends entirely upon legislative grace.65
62. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION art. VIII, §8.02 (6th ed.
1963). This model provision would authorize a municipality to "exercise any legislative power
or perform any function." Id. See also ALAs. CONsT. art. X, §11.
63. Sandalow, supra note 23, at 690-91. "Conversely, [such provisions] tend to deny the
judiciary power to curb abuse of municipal authority. A court sensitive to the limitations
on its own competence that is postulated by the separation of powers would rarely, if ever,
hold that a particular power, however inappropriate for exercise at the local level, exceeded
municipal initiative. To do so would require . . . the court . . . to go even further and
determine that the power not only was not delegable but that [it] would exceed the authority
of the legislature as itell." Id.at 691.
64. -GA. CoNsT.art. XV, §1.
65. See note 27 supra.
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At the other extreme are constitutional home rule provisions that plainly
evidence an intention to limit legislative power to interfere in local governmental affairs. 66 Other provisions, which although appearing to retain legislative supremacy over all municipal affairs' 7 have been interpreted as creating
an area within which cities can govern themselves entirely free from state control. 6 8 In both of these cases, ascertaining the scope of this local autonomy,

which the United States Supreme Court termed an "imperium in imperio,"69
necessitates a determination of whether a given function is of statewide or
local concern. 70
Although several tests have been devised,71 the determination in most instances is exceedingly difficult. The Nebraska supreme court has confessed: "It
is not easy in all cases to distinguish between municipal powers and state
powers, and when they come within the classification of police powers, they
are as impossible of accurate definition as the police power itself."'

2

The con-

fusion has not been lessened by the use of identical terminology, that is, municipal affairs, to deal with two fundamentally different problems - the extent
of municipal initiative and limitation on legislative power. One commentator
states that an examination of the cases reveals that different results may be
had depending on how the question is raised He suggests that courts with
some frequency hold:7-

[A] matter to be of "local concern" for the purposes of sustaining the
exercise of municipal power in the absence of conflicting state legislation and yet of "statewide concern" when confronted with the question
whether state legislation on the same subject prevails over inconsistent
local law.
Several recently adopted constitutional home rule provisions- follow the
National League of Cities model home rule provisions,76 which reject the

66. E.g., COLO. CONST. art. XX, §6. CAL. CONsT. art. XI, §6 permits legal governmental
bodies to: [M]ake and enforce all laws and regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject only to the restrictions and limitations provided in their several charters and in respect
to other matters they shall be subject to and controlled by general laws."
67. E.g., OHIO CONsT. art. X, §3; OKLA. CONsT. art. XVIII, §3(a). See generally E. MICHELMAN 8&T. SANDALOW, GOVERNMENT IN URBAN AREAS 349-53 (1970).
68. Lackey v. State, 29 Okla. 255, 116 P. 913 (1911); Kansas City v. Marsh Oil Co., 140
Mo. 458, 41 S.W. 943 (1897). See also Merrill, Constitutional Home Rule for Cities - Oklahoma Version, 5 OKLA. L. REV. 139, 149-50 (1952); Schmandt, Municipal Home Rule in
Missouri, 1953

WASH.

U.L.Q. 385, 387-88.

69. St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465, 468 (1893).
70. Vanlandingham, supra note 28, at 291.
71. See 1 C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS LAW §3.36 (1968).
72. Consumers Coal Co. v. City of Lincoln, 108 Neb. 51, 189 N.W. 643, 646 (1922).
73. F. M1CHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, supra note 67, at 351.
74. Id. at 351-52.
75. E.g., Mo. CONST. art. VI, §19; N.D. CONST. § 130; S.D. CONST. art. IX, §2.
76. AMERICAN MUNICIPAL ASSOCIATION (National League of Cities), MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL
(1953).

PROVISIONS FOR MfUNICIPAL HOME RULE §6
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imperium in imperio approach 77 by enabling cities to exercise all power and
functions not denied by the state legislature. Missouri, for example, has

adopted a provision with the specific intention of eliminating the "judiciallycreated areas of local autonomy where municipal enactments are deemed superior to state statutes." 78 In these states the validity of growth control ordi-

nances no longer depends upon the court's classification of the ordinance as a
matter of local concern, but rather depends upon the court's determination of
whether a conflict existed between a state statute and the local enactment.7 9

and implied
A sizeable body of case law, based on the doctrines of preemption
80
preemption, is available to aid courts in this determination.
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION: PERMISSILE REGULATION

Growth control measures, like all ordinances that regulate the use of land,

must find their justification in some aspect of the police power.8' Ascertaining
83
the constitutional scope of such police power82 involves a two-step analysis.
First, an initial determination of whether the purpose of the regulation comes
within acceptable objectives of the police power, that is, the protection of
health, safety and morals, or the general welfare is required.8 4 The courts next
must examine whether the specific exercise of regulatory power is "reasonable,"' 5 which is customarily considered under four rubrics: arbitrariness,
confiscation, discrimination, or taking. 6 This traditional analysis has its organic base in the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment 7 and the taking clause of the fifth amendment.88

Despite this analytical framework, manageable guidelines have never been

77. See Vanlandingham, supra note 28, at 308.
78. Comment, State-Local Conflicts Under the New Missouri Home Rule Amendment,
37 Mo. L. Rxv. 677, 681 (1972).
79. Id. But see Vanlandingham, supra note 28, at 310-11.
80. See generally Feller, Conflict Between State and Local Enactments- The Doctrine of
Implied Preemption, 2 URBAN LAW. 398 (1970); Montgomery, State Pre-emption and Local
Legislation, 4 SANTA CLARA LAW. 188 (1963).
81. Cf. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1925); accord, State
ex rel. Taylor v. City of Jacksonville, 101 Fla. 1241, 133 So. 114 (1931).
82. The term "police power" has no exact definition. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32
(1954); Hunter v. Green, 142 Fla. 104, 108, 194 So. 379, 380 (1940). The Florida supreme
court has said that the police power has its origin, purpose, and scope in the general welfare of the state or as it is sometimes expressed the public health, public morals, and public
safety. Marcy v. Mayo, 103 Fla. 552, 569-70, 139 So. 121, 128 (1931). It has also been said
that the police power is the least limitable of all governmental powers. Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915).
83. Heyman & Gihool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs
on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119, 1122 (1964).
84. Id. See also Perry Trading Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 128 Fla. 424, 174 So. 854 (1937).
.85. Heyman & Gihool, supra.note .83, at 1122.
86. Id. at 1124.
87. U.S. CONsT amend. XIV, §1.
88. Id. amend. V.
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developed against which an ordinance regulating use of land may be measured.
In determining the constitutionality of a specific regulatory exercise, courts
often avoid the difficult analytical task of articulating a substantive decision by
relying upon procedural rules.8 9 In rejecting constitutional attacks, courts
usually indulge in two judicial presumptions. The first is that legislative determinations of debatable questions are predicated upon rational grounds.90
The second is that the exercise of the police power is valid, the burden of
overcoming this presumption being imposed upon whoever attacks it.91 Without relying on these presumptions, other decisions invalidating land use controls have stated no foundation for their holdings, 92 simply phrasing them in
general conclusory descriptions of the regulation as arbitrary, unreasonable, or
confiscatory. 9 3 Despite the lack of judicial articulation an attempt must be
made to identify the policies that might influence a court ruling on the constitutionality of a growth limiting ordinance.
Since the Florida supreme court has recognized that the police power is in
a constant state of evolution 94 and because suits might be initiated in federal
court, the following examination will include cases from other jurisdictions
and will deal not only with the Boca Raton type population cap, 95 but also
with such other approaches to limiting population growth as low density zoning and timed-sequence development.
Substantive Due Process
The range of purposes of land use regulation that comes within the acceptable objectives of the police power has expanded considerably as courts have
replaced nuisance analysis- 6 with reliance on the general welfare provision of
the police power doctrine.97 While the traditional purposes of Euclidean zoning have received general acceptance, 98 this has not resulted in complete judicial abdication of responsibility for reviewing the objectives sought to be
accomplished by land use regulations. Perhaps the most conspicuous example

89. Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria,44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 13 (1971).
90. See 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
91. Cf. Snively Groves, Inc. v. Mayo, 135 Fla. 300, 184 So. 839 (1938).
92. See Girsh's Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
93. See, e.g., State Highway Dep't v. Branch, 222 Ga. 770, 152 S.E.2d 373 (1966).
94. McInerney v. Ervin, 46 So. 2d 458, 463 (1950).
95. See text accompanying notes 7-9 supra.
96. Early statutes barring noxious uses in residential areas were upheld as valid legislative efforts to proscribe nuisance-like uses. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upholding ordinance outlawing operation of preexisting brickyard within recently expanded
city limits as a proper exercise of police power). Even the landmark zoning decision of
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), upheld comprehensive regulation to avoid nuisance-like impacts generated by particular uses in particular areas, for example, commercial establishments in single family dwelling areas. Id. at 387-88. See Heyman
& Gihool, supra note 83, at 1123.
97. Heyman & Gihool, supra note 83, at 1123.
98. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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of this permissible objectives test is the prevalence of the view that zoning
cannot be used to promote solely aesthetic objectives.99
More relevant to this analysis, however, is a series of decisions by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Although not squarely confronted with an ordinance limiting growth, the court considered actions by various municipalities
attempting to discourage population influxes through the use of zoning. The
Pennsylvania supreme court in National Land 6 Investment Co. v. Easttown
Township Board of Adjustment0 0 invalidated a four-acre minimum lot requirement in a residential district. After examining and rejecting the township's alleged public purposes,10' the court looked beyond the precise issue of
the case and stated that a "zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers in order to avoid future burdens, economic
and otherwise, upon the administration of public services and facilities cannot
be held valid.' 1 2 This position was clarified in Kit-Mar Builder's, Inc. v.
Township of Concord,'03 where the court said: 04
The implications of our decision in National Land is that communities
must deal with the problems of population growth. They may not refuse
to confront the future by adopting zoning regulations that effectively restrict population to near present levels. It is not for any given township
to say who may or may not live within its confines, while disregarding
the interests of the entire area.
While in National Land lip service was paid to the presumption that legislative determinations upon debatable questions are predicted upon rational
grounds, 0 5 the court in Kit-Mar Builders appeared to have reversed the presumption.2O6 Looking beyond the stated purposes of the ordinance to the
actual effect of the implementation of the ordinance, the court declared "that
a scheme of zoning that has no exclusionary purpose or result is not acceptable ... ."107 In addition, the court appears to have changed the traditional
burden of proof from the challenger of the ordinance to the municipality by
stating that "[a]bsent some extraordinary justification, a zoning ordinance

99.

See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Desert Outdoor Advertising v. County

of San Bernardino, 255 Cal. App. 2d 465, 63 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1967); United Advertising Corp.
v. Borough of Metuchin, 35 N.J. 193, 172 A-2d 429 (1961), on remand, 76 N.J. Super. 301,
184 A.2d 441 (1962). But see State v. Diamond Motors, 492 P.2d 825 (Hawaii 1967); State v.
Buckley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 128, 243 N.E.2d 66 (1968).
100. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1966).
101. Among alleged public purposes was the necessity to insure proper sewage disposal
and to protect township water from pollution. Id. at 525-26, 215 A.2d at 608. Additional
justifications were the inadequacy of township roads and the burden that would be imposed
upon that road system and the preservation of the character of the area. Id. at 526-29, 215
A.2d at 609-12.
102. 419 Pa. at 532, 215 A.2d at 612.
103. 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
104. Id. at 474, 268 A.2d at 768-69.
105. 419 Pa. at 521-22, 215 A.2d at 607.
106. 439 Pa. at 495-96, 268 A.2d at 779 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 470, 268 A.2d at 766 (emphasis added).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol26/iss4/2

12

Juergensmeyer and Gragg: Limiting Population Growth in Florida and the Nation: The Constit
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXVI

with minimum lot sizes such as those in this case [2 and 3 acres] is completely
unreasonable."' 08 These decisions appear to respond to a policy issue posed by
a legal commentator in an analysis of exclusionary zoning'0 9 concerning "the
quantum of acknowledged social injustice involved in a formal governmental
unit excluding or segregating people on the basis of their means."'110 The
Pennsylvania supreme court appears to have answered that question in National Land by declaring that a township cannot "stand in the way of the
natural forces which send our growing population into hitherto undeveloped
areas in search of a comfortable place to live.""'
11
This line of Pennsylvania cases was followed by a New Jersey court, '
which invalidated a zoning ordinance requiring minimum lot size and floor
space and providing for a limited number of multifamily units."' The court
stated that housing needs are encompassed within the general welfare and a
"Municipality must not ignore ... its fair proportion of the obligation to meet
the housing needs of its own population and of the region.""14
The First Circuit Court of Appeals in Steel Hill Development, Inc. v.
Town of Sanbornton"5 recently upheld a rezoning ordinance increasing minimum lot size from 35,000 square feet to 3 and 6 acres." 0G The case at first
reading appears to oppose the line of Pennsylvania cases as it recognized:117
[A]s within the general welfare, concerns relating to the construction
and integration of hundreds of new homes which would have an irreversible effect on the area's ecological balance, destroy scenic values,
decrease open space, significantly change the rural character of this
small town, pose substantial financial burdens on the town for police,
sewer and road service ....
As the court pointed out, however, the factual situation in Steel Hill is readily
distinguishable from the Pennsylvania cases. Whereas those cases involved an
108. Id. at 471, 268 A.2d at 767.
109. Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection and the Indigent,
21 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1969); see Kit-Mar Builders, Inc. v. Township of Concord, 439 Pa.
466, 470 n.2, 268 A.2d 765, 766 n.2 (1970).
110. Sager, supra note 109, at 791.
111. 419 Pa. at 532, 215 A.2d at 612.
112. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d
353 (Law Div. 1971). See also Molino v. Mayor & Council of the Borough of Glassboro, 116
N.J. Super. 195, 281 A.2d 401 (Law Div. 1971). But cf. J.D. Constr. Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment, 119 N.J. Super. 140, 290 A.2d 452 (Law Div. 1972).
113. 117 N.J. Super. at 22, 283 A.2d at 359. The ordinance in question zoned approximately 55% of the land area of the township either R40, minimum lot size 1 acre and
minimum floor space 1500 square feet, or R80, minimum lot size 2 acres and minimum floor
space 1600 square feet. Additionally the multifamily zones were so restricted that no more
than 500 to 700 additional units could be built. Three or more bedroom units were not
permitted and two bedroom units were limited to 20% of the total units in any apartment
development. Id. at 16, 283 A.2d at 556.
114. Id. at 20, 283 A.2d at 358.
115. 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972).
116. Id. at 963.
117. Id. at 961.
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unnatural limiting of suburban expansion into towns in the path of population growth, the Sanbornton ordinance responded to a proposed development
that sought to create a demand for second homes rather than to satisfy an already existing demand for suburban expansion.31 The court further showed
its reluctance in upholding the ordinance by referring to the ordinance as a
stop-gap measure and indicating that if the pressures of expansion were more
19
real a different result would have been reached.
The Steel Hill court seemed to indicate that the growth restriction ordinance would be effective only until an adequate study of future needs could
be made and a plan developed to deal with these needs. 20 Such a plan providing for phased growth was upheld by the New York Court of Appeals in
Golden v. Town of Ramapo.1 2 The Ramapo plan used a residential development timing technique 22 for the alleged purpose of eliminating premature
subdivision, urban sprawl, and development without adequate municipal facilities and services. 23 The majority recognized the exclusionary possibilities,
stating that it would not countenance exclusion under any guise. 24 It believed,
however, that the plan at issue, far from being exclusionary, was aimed at providing a "balanced cohesive community dedicated to the efficient utilization of
land."' 25 Although the factual settings in this case and the Pennsylvania cases
are somewhat analogous, 26 the New York court placed great importance on the
fact that the Ramapo plan, unlike the Pennsylvania minimum lot requirements, did not impose permanent restrictions upon land use. 27 The court

118. Id. at 960.
119. Id. at 962.

120. Id.
121. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.

1003 (1972).
122. The plan did not rezone or reclassify any land into different residential or use
districts- but provided that any person engaged in residential development must obtain a
special permit. "The standards for the issuance of special permits are framed in terms of
the availability to the proposed subdivision plat of five essential facilities or services, specifically: (1) public sanitary sewers or approved substitutes; (2) drainage facilities; (3) improved public parks 'or recreation facilities, including public schools; (4) state, county, or
town roads- major, secondary, or collector; and (5) firehouses. No special permit shall issue
unless the proposed residential development has accumulated 15 development points, to be
computed on a sliding scale of values assigned to the specified improvements under the
statute." Additionally, a developer, by agreeing to provide those improvements that would
bring the proposed plat within the number of development points could advance the date
of subdivision approval. Also, applications to the "Development Easement Acquisition Commission" for a reduction of the assessed valuation were authorized. Id. at 368-69, 285 N.E.2d
at 295-96, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143-44.
123. Id. at 367, 285 N.E.2d at 295, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143.
124. Id. at 378, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
125. Id.
126. The town of Ramapo, with the opening of the Tappan Zee Bridge became an easy
25-mile commute from the heart of New York City. Bosselman, Can the Town of Ramapo
Pass a Law To Bind the Rights of the Whole World?, 1 FLA. S.U.L. Rayv. 234, 238 (1973).
127. 30 N.Y.2d at 378-79, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
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further distinguished between an attempt to freeze population at present levels
and a plan designed to maximize growth through efficient use of land. 12
While these distinctions are valid, the majority opinion nevertheless refused to look beyond the purposes of the ordinance to its actual effect. It has
been suggested by one commentator that the effect of a Ramapo plan will be
to exclude all but upper income groups by restricting the amount of land
available for housing and increasing its costs. 12 9 This same comentator has

pointed out that the Ramapo plan will force development further and further
into rural areas and, though preventing urban sprawl within the borders of
the planned town, will contribute to the far more serious problem of megalopolitan sprawl.130
Thus, although there is precedent in several jurisdictions supporting the
position that population growth control is a permissible objective of land use
regulation under the police power, when it comes to judging the various ways
in which local government may seek to accomplish their objectives, it is significant to note the strong emphasis inRamapo, the leading case, on the fact
that the Ramapo plan did not contemplate permanent restrictions on land development. A slowing down of growth rather than a population freeze or cap
was intended. In other words, those courts that have approved the Ramapo or
Ramapo-type plan have stressed the distinction between timing the pace of
growth and preventing or severely limiting growth.
The "Taking Issue"
Closely related to the doctrine of substantive due process is the "taking"
issue, which permits opponents of growth control measures to challenge the
constitutionality of population growth control ordinances as applied to a
particular piece of property.' 3' Under the United States Constitution, private
property is afforded protection under both the due process clause 13 2- and the
fifth amendment taking clause, 133 as incorporated into the fourteenth amendment.13 4 Comparable protection is afforded by the Florida constitution- and
the constitutions of other states. 36 None of these constitutional provisions
establishing and guaranteeing property rights, however, give much guidance
by way of defining "ownership" or establishing the quality of the "ownership"
right. As a result, the conflict between the rights of property owners and the

128. Id. at 379, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
129. Bosselman, supra note 126, at 248. "This prediction appears to have been fulfilled as
the average price of a house in Ramapo is S43,000, S3,000-S5,000 higher than those in surrounding towns. Housing for people in the $10,000-S20,000 income bracket has been practically eliminated." St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times, Nov. 18, 1973, §6, at 1, col. I.
130. Bosselman, supra note 126, at 248.
131. See generally Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
132.
133.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.

134.

Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
FLA. CONsT. art. I, §2.

135.
136.

E.g., IND. CoNSr. art. I, §21; IowA CONsr. art. I, §18; MICH. CONsT. art. 10, §2.
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interests and needs of society has been conceptualized in our legal system almost exclusively in terms of the supposed dichotomy between a taking of
property, which is impermissible unless compensation is paid, and a "mere"
regulation of property for which compensation is not due even if the regula13 7
tion causes the landowner to suffer economic loss.
Because American legislators and judges, like constitutional draftsmen,
have largely ignored the conceptual bases of the ownership right from a quality of ownerslp standpoint, distinguishing between a "taking" and a "regulation" of property has become one of the more mystical rites performed by
American jurists. Early cases facing this task found a compensable taking only
when governmental action resulted in a physical invasion of the property in
question. 88 This test functioned quite well during a period of rudimentary
exercise of the police power. 39 Dissatisfaction with this test grew, however, as
the scope of the police power increased 40 culminating in Justice Holmes'
landmark opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.'1' According to Pro42
fessor Sax:
Holmes saw no difference between traditional taking and traditional exercise of the police power, but only a continuum in which property interests were asked to yield more or less to the pressures of public demand.
To Holmes, the difference between regulation and taking was a difference of
degree, not kind, and therefore the resolution of each controversy depends
143
upon the particular facts involved.
While many theories have been proposed,. 44 no definitive theory has

137. See Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Ambler Realty Co. v. Village
of Euclid, 297 F. 307 (1924), rev'd, 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See generally F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, Tin TAKING ISSUE (1973).
138. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166
(1871).
139. See Sax, Taking and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 39 (1964).
140. The physical invasion test failed to "recognize that regulation may become so substantial or severe that the owner is precluded from making any reasonable use of his property. Conceptually, the standard assumes that the objectives gained by actual appropriation
cannot be achieved by regulation. . . . [H]owever, appropriation and regulation may be
merely alternative techniques for achieving the same goals." Harris, Environmental Regulations, Zoning, and Withheld Municipal Services: Taking of Property by Multi-Governmental
Action, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 635, 640 (1973).
141. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
142. Sax, supra note 139, at 51.
143. See F. BOSsELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, supra note 137, at 137.
144. Professor Dunham's theory uses as its basis the purpose of the governmental interference with land use. Compensation hinges on whether the regulation is for the prevention
of harm, in which case no compensation need be paid, or whether it is for benefit extraction,
in which case compensation is required. Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City
Planning, 58 CoLum. L. Rxv. 560, 663-69 (1958). Professor Sax's theory divides the state's
interest into entrepreneurial and mediatory roles. Compensation is required when the government enhances its resource position in an enterprise capacity at the expense of privately
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evolved to separate permissible regulation from prohibited taking. Although
an extensive analysis of the developments in this area is beyond the scope of
this article, 145 an examination of several recent cases should provide some insight into possible judicial trends in the area as they relate to municipal
growth control measures. The Ramapo146 court recognized as a taking ordinances permanently restricting the use of property to such an extent that it
may not be used for any reasonable purpose.' 4 7 The court, however, impliedly
classified the Ramapo plan as temporary, allowing property to be put to use
within a reasonable time, 14s despite the fact that the plan restricts development for up to 18 years in certain areas. 149 Further, the court stressed that the
restrictions were not absolute. The owners of the property had the option to
accelerate the date of development by installing at their own expense necessary
public services, 150 and certain uses were still permitted within residential districts.15 The court also discussed the prospect of appreciated values and
interim reductions in assessed value as further mitigating factors. 52 The
Ramapo decision gave no intimation of whether the same result would have
been reached in the absence of these mitigating factors. Judging from the
court's reliance upon these factors, however, it is apparent that they played an
important role in the decision.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals in Steel Hill153 summarily dismissed
the taking issue, finding that "though the value of the tract has been decreased
considerably, it is not worthless or useless so as to constitute a taking.""54 This
case is tempered, however, by the temporary nature of the decision in upholding the rezoning and upzoning.15
Although not directly related to population growth restriction, the Wis-

owned property. Sax, supra note 139, at 61-64. Professor Michaelman proposes a fairness
test in which compensation would be based on whether it is "fair to effectuate this social
measure without granting this claim to compensation for the private loss inflicted thereby."
Michacman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundation of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1172 (1967). Another thoretical approach is the
balancing test, under which no compensation need be paid if the social gains resulting from
the governmental regulation outweigh the encroachment on private property rights. See

generally Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain -Policy and Concept, 42 CALIF. L. REV.
596 (1954). A theory known as the diminution in value test, often attributed to Justice
Holmes, utilizes the magnitude of the property owner's loss as the controlling factor. Harris,
supra note 140, at 652. A recent analysis of Florida decisions in this area concluded that the
standard the courts apply in judging whether the government action amounts to a taking
of property is unclear. Harris, supra note 140, at 651.
145. For a more in-depth analysis, see authorities cited note 144 supra.
146. See text accompanying notes 121-130 supra.
147. 30 N.Y.2d at 390, 285 N.E.2d at 303, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 154.
148. Id. at 380-81, 285 N.E.2d at 303, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 154.
149. Id.
150. 30 N.Y.2d at 382, 285 N.E.2d at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 155.
151. Id.
152. 30 N.Y.2d at 382, 285 N.E.2d at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
153. See text accompanying notes 115-119 supra.
154. 469 F.2d at 963.
155. See text accompanying note 119 supra.
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consin supreme court's -decision in Just v. Marinette GountyI56 represents an
unusually pro-governmental resolution of the issue of regulation of private
property to further the public welfare without paying compensation. The
case arose as a challenge to a Shoreline Zoning Ordinance that placed the
plaintiff's land in a conservancy district. 57 The court stated the issue as "a
conflict between the public interest in stopping the despoilation of natural
' 58
resources . . . and an owner's asserted right to use his property as he wishes.'
The compensation determination was formulated in terms of whether the restrictions were placed on the property to create a public benefit or to prevent
a public harm. 59 After finding a public right in the preservation of natural
resources,16 0 the court declared that it is not an unreasonable exercise of the
police power "to prevent harm to public rights by limiting the use of private
property to its natural uses.''
Any assessment of the potential result of the application of "taking issue"
principles to municipal growth control measures must begin with the recognition that the taking issue is at the center of the entire legal controversy concerning environmental law and land use planning and control law. The publication in recent months of The Taking Issue serves to highlight the importance of the issue and the controversy it elicits. The authors advocate
abandoning the Holmes "matter of degree" test and adopting the theory that
ordinarily there is no compensable taking unless there is a physical taking of
land. 162 Other authors have recently advocated greater recognition of public
rights to privately owned land through use of new or resurrected theories such
as public trust, 63 common lands, 64 and no guaranteed development right. 165
The value of all these theories is questionable because they tend to ignore and
camouflage the basic problem: the American legal system has never clearly

156. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.V.2d at 761 (1972).
157. Id. at 13-14, 201 N.W.2d at 766.
158. Id. at 14-15, 201 N.W.2d at 767.
159. Id. at 16, 201 N.W.2d at 767.
160. Id. at 16, 201 N.W.2d at 768.
161. Id. at 17, 201 N.V.2d at 768.
162. F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLiEs 8 J. BANTA, supra note 137, at 238-55. The authors suggest in the alternative that (1) no "taking" should be found as long as the public purposes
served by the regulations were important and (2) that statutory standards be drafted to
determine when compensation is required. Id. at 256-83. The "taking issue" controversy was
recently brought to the attention of Florida lawyers in the form of a debate at the March 9,
1974, Second Annual Young Lawyers Convention. The participants were Mr. Bosselman and
Professors Finnell and Lefcoe. See Landowners Rights v. Land Use Regulation (March 9,

1974).
163. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective judicial
Intervention,68 MIcH. L. REv.473 (1970).
164. Juergensmeyer & Wadley, The Common Lands Concept: A "Commons" Solution to
(1974).
a Common Environmental Problem, 14 NATURAL REsouRcVs J.
165. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972); Little, New Attitudes
About Legal Protectionfor the Remains of Florida'sNatural Environment, 23 U. FLA. L. REv.
459 (1971). See Hillsborough County Environmental Protection Comm'n v. Franderson Properties, 283 So. 2d 65 (2d D.C.A.Fla. 1973 .
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come to grips with the problem of formulating a theory of ownership. Most
"taking" cases constitute either an acceptance of or an exception to the nineteenth century liberal theory of ownership best expressed by the tort principle
that a landowner may do as he wishes with his property so long as he does not
interfere with the exercise of that same right by other landowners. Most industrialized nations long ago shifted from the liberal theory to the social function concept of ownership whereby the sacrosanct, God-given character of
private property rights is abandoned in favor of a recognition that the quality
of ownership is definable only in terms of the needs of a specific society at a
given period of time.166 Only when such a philosophical change is consciously
made will the taking issue be capable of resolution on a consistent and pre6 7

dictable basis.1

Equal Protection
Growth-limiting ordinances may also be attacked as violative of the equal
protection clauselo 8 through the contention that they discriminate on the
basis of race or wealth. The Supreme Court has recognized classification on
either of these bases as highly suspect and therefore subject to exacting judicial
scrutiny. G9 While the stronger method of attack would be to show a racial
motive or purpose on the part of the governmental unit, 170 this might prove
difficult with a growth restriction ordinance because of its esssentially indiscriminate exclusionary effect.
166. The theory was first proposed by Leon Duguit. One of the few comprehensive discussions of Duguit's theory and its present day application is contained in the mimeograph
but unpublished lectures of Professor M. E. Kadam of the University of Geneva prepared
for Facult6 Internationale pour l'Enseignement Du Droit Compare and entitled La Notion
et les Limites de la Proprietd Privee en Droit Compare.
Perhaps the clearest expression of the social function theory in this hemisphere is the
provision in the 1940 Cuban Constitution: "The Cuban Nation recognizes the existence and
legitimacy of private property in its broadest concept as a social function and without other
limitations than those which, for reasons of public necessity or social inteersts, are established
by law." CUBA CONST. art. 87 (1940).
167. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Juergensmeyer, The American Legal
System and Environmental Pollution, 23 U. FLA. L. Rrv. 439, 447-48 (1971). The United
States Supreme Court has indicated a general acceptance of the social function theory. United
States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945); WVickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill
(1942); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
168. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, §1.
169. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969). Two quite distinguishable tests exist for application of the equal protection clause. The rationality test
essentially determines whether the classification drawn by the legislation bears a conceivably
reasonable relation to a permissible state objective sought to be achieved by the statute. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). The "rationality" test is typically employed to
attack a form of economic regulation. More v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 463 (1957). Where the
classification touches on a fundamental right, the stricter standard of whether it promotes
a compelling state interest is applied. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
170. See, e.g., Dailey v. Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970); Kennedy Park Homes
Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971);
Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), afi'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972).
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A seemingly more useful approach would be to claim de facto discrimination against low-income individuals."'1 It could be argued that as a result of
growth restrictive regulations such as large minimum lot size and restrictions
on the number of multidwelling units, housing costs are prohibitive for lowincome families.' 72 This approach was recognized by way of dictum in Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union City'"7 where a referendum nullified a zoning variance that would have allowed the construction
of low-income housing. 7 4 Speaking to the assertion that the effect of the referendum was to deny decent housing and an integrated environment to lowincome residents, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said: 75
If apart from voter motive the result of this zoning by referendum is
discriminatory in this fashion, in our view a substantial constitutional
question is presented. Surely, if the environmental benefits of land use
planning are to be enjoyed by a city and the quality of life of its residents is accordingly to be improved, the poor cannot be excluded from
enjoyment of the benefits.
A similar issue was raised in Ramapo,7 6 but the New York Court of Appeals was satisfied by the town's argument that it had proposed to build
biracial low-income family housing, 77 and that it had defended such proposals
against the attacks of its own citizens. 78 A recent article found that this housing has been completed and consists of approximately 200 units, of which
about fifty are occupied by low-income families, ten to twenty per cent of
whom are black. 79 According to a recent interview with a local official no
further low-income housing is contemplated. 180
As the same commentator has noted "the wolf of exclusionary zoning hides
under the environmental sheepskin worn by the stop-growth movement."''
Thus, it would appear that a growth restriction plan that failed to provide
adequately for low-income families would be ripe for attack. A problem exists
in the federal courts, however, because the few governmental discriminations
based on wealth that have been struck down by the Supreme Court have involved payment of a fee as a statutory precondition to the enjoyment of what

171. See Schwartz, Exclusionary Zoning- Suggested Constitutional Attacks, 4 CwEuINGHOUsE REV. 345, 361 (1970). See generally Sager, supra note 109; Note, Exclusionary Zoning
and Equal Protection, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1645 (1971); Note, The Responsibility of Local
Zoning Authorities to Nonresident Indigents, 23 STAN. L. REv. 774 (1971).
172. Schwartz, supra note 171, at 361.
173. 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970). But cf. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
174. 424 F.2d at 292.
175. Id. at 295.

176. See text accompanying notes 124-125 supra.
177. 30 N.Y.2d at 368 n.2, 285 N.E.2d at 292 n.2, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143 n.2.
178. See Fletcher v. Romney, 323 F. Supp. 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Larrelly v. Town of
Ramapo, 317 N.Y.S.2d 837 (App. Div. 1970).
179.
180.
181.

Bosselman, supra note 126, at 249,
Id.
Id,
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the Court has described as a fundamental personal right.18 2 A further complication arises where the growth restrictive ordinance is the result of a referendum. The prevailing judicial attitude appears to be that a referendum is
founded on neutral principles and should be exempt from federal court re4
straints. s3 The leading case in the area is James v. Valtierray8
in which the
Supreme Court reversed a three-judge panel's holding 5 that article 34 of the
California constitution, which required voter approval of proposed low-rent
housing projects, violated equal protection s6 The court refused to impose the
compelling state interest criteria because it found that article 34 made no
distinction based on race,' s - and declined to extend the compelling state interest test to classifications based on wealth.185 The court placed great stress on
the referendum as a procedure for democratic decisionmaking, saying: "[R]eferendums demonstrate devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination, or
prejudice."' 1s9 Although Valtierra could be read as unequivocally supporting
referenda, it could also be interperted as a refusal to extend further the compelling state interest standard of the equal protection clause.19°
Right To Travel
As there appears to be a strong inclination toward limiting the scope of
modern equal protection,19' the constitutional right to travel has been sug192
gested as an alternate means of challenging restrictive land use regulations.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the freedom to migrate to and settle
in any state is constitutionally protected. 93 At various times this right to travel
has been attributed to the privileges and immunities clauses of both articles
IV 1 94 and the fourteenth amendment, 19 the due process clause of the fifth

182. Note, The Right To Travel: Another Constitutional Standard for Local Land Use
Regulations?, 39 U .CH. L. REV. 612, 619 (1972).
183. Ranjel v.City of Lansing, 417 F.2d 321, 324 (9th Cir. 1970); Spaulding v. Blair, 403
F.2d 862, 865 (4th Cir. 1968); cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1969).
184. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
185. Valtierra v. Housing Authority, 313 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Cal. 1970), rev'd, 402 U.S. 137
(1971).
186. 402 U.S. at 143.
187. Id. at 141.
188. Id. at 144-45 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 143.
190. Comment, The Right To Travel and Its Application to Restrictive Housing Laws,
66 Nw. U.L. REV. 635, 666 (1971-1972). A possible way to avoid the apparant federal limitation would be to bring the action under the Florida equal protection clause. FLA. CONsT.
art. I, §2.
191. Sager, supra note 109, at 779-80. Cf. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
192. See Note, supra note 182, at 623.
193. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 358 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969).
194. Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1870); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 168, 180 (1869).
195. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 182
(Jackson, J., concurring).
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amendment, 96 and the commerce-clause.19 7 The Supreme Court in Shapiro v.
Thompson,9 s however, refused to ascribe the source of the right to travel,1 99
21
instead quoting20 0 Justice Stewart's statement in United States v. Guest: 0
The constitutional right to travel from one state to another ...occupies
a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a
right that has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized.
To invalidate local land use regulations as violative of the right to travel,
it would be necessary to show that such regulations impose a penalty on that
right. 202 The Supreme Court in Shapiro, in invalidating a one-year residency
requirement for eligibility for welfare payments, 203 considered two elements
of the penalty concept.2 04 The first construed was the state's intention to deter
people from moving into the state and burdening welfare rolls. 20 5 The second
element viewed was the seriousness of the benefit denied, in this case welfare
payments used to secure the necessities of life.206 Because of the Shapiro Court's
failure to clarify the degree of penalty necessary to invoke the compelling
state interest test, there existed a lack of uniformity in decisions based on
20 7
Some courts required the presence of both elements 208 while others
Shapiro.
required neither.209 Subsequently, the Court in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa
County,210 recognizing the lack of clarity in the Shapiro penalty analysis, 211
discussed the amount of impact required to give rise to the compelling state
interest test.212 The Court repeated its earlier statement 213 that it is not neces21 4
sary to show that anyone was actually deterred from traveling, and stated:

196. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116, 125 (1958) (cases involved the freedom of Americans to travel outside the country).
197. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 (1941); Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
283 (1849).
198. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
199. Id. at 630.
200. Id.
201. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
202. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 380, 340 (1972). See also Note, ConstitutionalLaw
-

Equal Protection- Penalty on the Right To Travel - Durational Residency Requirements,

1973 Wis. L. R-v. 914, 919-23.
203. 394 U.S. at 627.
204. See Memorial Iosp. v- Maricopa Co., 94 S.Ct. 1076, 1081 (1974). See also Note,
supra note 202, at 920.
205. 394 U.S. at 629.
206. Id.
207. See Note, supra note 202, at 921.
208. See, e.g., Lontham v. McKeithan, 336 F. Supp. 153 (E.D. La. 1971); Ferguson v.
Williams, 330 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
209. Cole v. Housing Authority, 453 F.2d 807 (Ist Cir. 1970); Kohn v. Davis, 320 F. Supp.

246 (D.Vt. 1970).
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

94 S. Ct. 1076 (1974).
Id. at 1081.

Id."
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972),
94 S.Ct. at 1082.
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Shapiro and Dunn stand for the proposition that a classification which
who have exercised their constitu-

operates to penalize those persons ...

tional right of inter-state migration must be justified by a compelling
state interest.
The Court, however, shed little light on the ultimate parameters of the Shapiro
penalty analysis, finding only that medical care is as much a basic necessity of
2
life to an indigent as welfare assistance.

15

Construction Industry Association of Sonoma Co. v. City of Petaluma216
represents the only case to date that has invalidated a local growth control
enactment as violative of the constitutional right to travel.21 7 The Petaluma
scenario is a familiar pattern in which a rural town 218 experiences large population influxes as a result of urban sprawl. Petaluma, however, unlike many of
its similarly situated sister cities, reacted by implementing a growth control
policy. The "Petaluma Plan" was basically an aggregation of resolutions, ordinances and plans that attempted to limit the number of dwelling units constructed in the city to 500 per year. 219 The principal ordinance implementing

215. Id.
216. 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
217. Id. at 581. The plan was also attacked as violative of the equal protection, due
process, and commerce clauses. The court found it unnecessary to consider these issues after
basing its decision on the right to travel. Id. at 586.
218. The City of Petaluma, although within modern commuting distance of San Francisco, had for the preceding hundred years been a rural market town. In 1950 the population was about 10,000, which had grown to 25,000 by 1970. The city then in two years added
5,000 new inhabitants. Hart, The Petaluma Case, 9 CRY CALIFORNIA 2, 6, 8 (1974).
219. The city council adopted an official development policy in June 1971, entitled
"Official Statement of Development Policy for the City of Petaluma." Also included in the
plan were the following ordinances:
(a) Petaluma Environmental Design Plan, March 27, 1962, PETALUMA RESOLUTION No.
6008 N.C.S. This plan would have allowed only 2,500 new dwelling units to be constructed
in the city over the next five years. It provided that a "greenbelt" - a landscape strip park
"approximately 200 feet in width" - would define the boundary for urban expansion during
"the next decade or two." Residential development outside the greenbelt was forbidden and
this was to be effectuated by the city refusing annexation and utility extension to the nonurban area and by soliciting the cooperation of Sonoma County in preventing development
outside the greenbelt.
(b) Petaluma Residential Development System, August 21, 1972, PETALUMA RESOLUTION
No. 6113 N.C.S. This system implemented the above policy and established a residential
development elaluation board to administer the annual 500-unit allocation.
(c) Petaluma Housing Element, September 5, 1972, PETALUMA RESOLUTION No. 6126 N.C.S.
This portion of the plan was intended to provide the city with data to "identify and
quantify" the city's housing problems and to make recommendations and plans for alleviating
them. It contained the following findings: (a) the city's growth rate is twice that of Sonoma
County; (b) insufficient rental and low-income housing exists in the city; (c) vacancy rates
are below normal averages for both new houses and apartments, indicating a tightening
housing market; (d) the city should establish "a rate of housing construction adequate to
provide a decent home for all residents regardless of age, sex, income, or ethnic background
with maximum choice of rental or ownership, type, price, and location"; (e) the city should
eliminate deficient housing and "stimulate private rehabilitation"; (f) the city should establish an annual percentage of 8 to 12 per cent of the annual housing allocation to be de-
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the plan was the Residential Development Evaluation System, which allocated
220
the available building permits on what was essentially a competitive basis.
The federal district court framed the issue as a question whether a municipality capable of supporting natural population expansion may limit
growth simply because it does not prefer to grow at the rate that would be
dictated by prevailing market demand.2 21 Then, applying the penalty analysis
22
as clarified by Memorial Hospital,

?

223
the court concluded as a matter of law:

[T]here is no meaningful distinction between a law which penalizes the
exercise of a right and one which denies it all together,[and that] it is
clear that the growth limitation under attack may be defended only
insofar as it furthers a compelling state interest.
The Petaluma court, noting the scarcity of case law, adopted the reasoning
of a series of Pennsylvania cases2 24 as best expressing the underlying rationale
of those federal cases recognizing the right to travel as fundamental. 225 The

Pennsylvania cases, while they did not consider the constitutional right to
travel, invalidated restrictive municipal zoning ordinances as violative of substantive due process. 22, The public purposes alleged in support of the Pennsylvania ordinances227 were similar to the compelling state interest urged by the
City of Petaluma, 22 8 and the reasoning of the Pennsylvania supreme court in
voted to "low to moderate income housing" on both sides of the freeway separating cast and
west Petaluma.
See Granklin, Memorandum 74-2, at 3-6 (The Potomac Institute, Metropolitan Housing
Program, Feb. 28, 1974). See also Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp.
514 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
220. The allocation process required that anyone hoping to build more than four units
in the coming building season must file plans with the residential development evaluation
board by September. This board then would eliminate any proposals that fail to comply
with the city's general plan and its environmental design plan. The remaining proposals
were rated by an elaborate two-part point system. A plan could be assigned up to 30 points
for access to existing and adequate services: streets, schools, drainage channels, fire protection,
and sewer mains. Another 80 points could be awarded for excellence of design, the inclusion of low-cost housing and needed facilities, and for providing open space and trail
links. Developments that failed to receive a minimum number of points -25 out of 30 in
the first group, 50 out of 80 in the second -,were eliminated. Following a public hearing, the
recommendations of the evaluation board were to be presented to the city council for final
disposition. See Hart, supra note 218, at 9.
221. 375 F. Supp. at 581.
222. See id. at 582.
223. 375 F. Supp. at 581.
224. Kit-Mar Builders, Inc. v. Township of Concord, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970);
Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 398 (1970); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419
Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1966); Bilbar Constr. v. Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d

851 (1958).
225. 375 F. Supp. at 584-86.
226. See text accompanying notes 100-111 supra.
227. See note 101 supra.
228. The city of Petaluma urged three compelling interests in support of the plan: (1)
lack of adequate sewage treatment facilities, (2) inadequacy of the city's water supply, and
(3) desire to protect the city's "small town character." 375 F. Supp. at 581-830.
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dismissing the alleged public purposes was quoted extensively with approval
by the Petaluma court. 229 Singificantly, in dismissing the purported compelling
state interests, the federal judge stated that it is not sufficient that the government activity furthers a very substantial interest if other reasonable ways to
achieve those goals exist with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected
activity.230 In analyzing the compelling state interests, that is, lack of sewage
capacity, inadequate water supply, et cetera, and the available alternatives,
231
the court stated:
The sole issue in this case is whether or not people currently excluded
from Petaluma have the right to immigrate into the area. If so, relief
will be granted and their rights will be enforced; after which the matter
of dealing with the natural burdens that the exercise of those rights
places upon the municipality falls entirely within the discretion of city
officials or the city electorate. Neither Petaluma city officials, nor the
local electorate may use their power to disapporve bonds at the polls as
a weapon to define or destroy fundamental constitutional rights.
Exactly how a municipality can be expected to respond to a never ending increase in demand for city services is left unanswered. Surely such a position is
not to be carried to its logical extremes.
Although the Petaluma court stressed that its decision was not intended to
interfere with local government's use of "traditional" zoning powers, 232 this
result does not necessarily follow from a close reading of the case. The court
23
quoted with approval from the plaintiff's brief: 3
[T]his case [holds] ... that local police power may [not] be used to shift
the burden of providing housing to other cities in a metropolitan region.
This would seem to indicate that a city's zoning must be responsive to demographic and market trends.
The above reasoning also appears to answer the question of the effect of
the Petaluma decision on the Ramapo plan 234 and variations thereon. It appears to preclude a city, such as Ramapo, in the path of metropolitan sprawl,
from using such zoning methods as large minimum lot sizes and exclusion of
multifamily units to avoid its share of the population spilling forth from the
center city.239r The court, again quoting plaintiff's brief, stated: 236

229. Id. at 586.
230. 375 F. Supp. at 583. The court, in discussing the alternatives, addressed itself to
the sewage problem and suggested as a solution both real and practical, increasing the
capacity of the existing sewage treatment plants. Id. at 583.
231.
232.
233.

Id.
Id. at 587.
Id.

234. See text accompanying notes 121-130 supra.
235. An examination of the effect of the Ramapo plan indicates that it has excluded
people who have a right to immigrate into the area and has shifted the burden of providing housing to other cities in the metropolitan region. New building starts on single
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The prospective resident turned away at Petaluma does not disappear
into the hinterland, but presents himself in some other suburb of the
same metroplex, perhaps in some town with as many problems or more
than Petaluma .... By this means, Petaluma legislates its problems into
problems for Napa, Vallejo or Walnut Creek. May Petalume pass a law
to bind the whole world?
Thus, an absolute population cap such as has been attempted in Boca Raton
clearly appears violative of the right-to-travel principle applied by the Petaluma court.
One question left partially unanswered by the Petaluma decision is: What
would have been the effect on the Petluma decision if the Petaluma Plan had
238
been enacted by a referendum3r as was the Boca Raton population cap?
The Valtierra decision with its strong language in support of referenda-9
could be "read as insulating the ordinance from attack. However, if the Valtierra decision is interpreted as a refusal to extend the compelling governmental interest standard rather than treating referenda as sacrosanct, then the
right-to-travel doctrine would appear equally applicable to growth restrictive
plans enacted by referendum. The Petaluma dictum concerning the inability
of the local electorate to use its power to disapprove bonds at the polls as a
weapon to define or destroy fundamental constitutional rights2 40 would also
support this-proposition.
CONCLUSION

For those who wish to maneuver through it, the labyrinth of population
dispersal control, as evidenced by recent municipal growth control measures,
is as yet without a thread to follow. Only in recent months have the legal
.
issues solidified. The most recent case in the area, Petaluma,241
is still in the
appellate process. Consequently, to offer even tentative substantive conclusions
at this point would be foolhardy. Nonetheless, conclusions regarding various
conceptual aspects of the problem and proposed resolutions of several conflicts
seem in order.

family homes in Ramapo, which had reached a record of 835 in 1966, fell to 189 in 1969
when the timed sequential development plan was put into effect, and since 1969 the number
of starts has not risen above 245. By contrast, in neighboring Clarkstown, which encompasses
a little over half of the land area of Ramapo, 1,139 new homes were started in 1972. Additionally Ramapo prohibits multifamily units and it is estimated that construction of 2,000
units of commercial housing has been blocked in the last seven years. See St. Petersburg (Fla.)
Times, Nov. 18, 1973, §G at I, col. 1.
236. 375 F. Supp. at 587 (emphasis added).
237. The voters of Petaluma in June 1973, in an advisory referendum voted their approval of the plan by a margin of more than 4-1. See Hart, supra note 218, at 9.
238. See Boca Raton, Fla., Resolution No. 109-72, Nov. 8; 1972.
- 239. - See text accompanying'note, 189 supra. 240. 375 F. Supp. at 583. See also text accompanying note 231 supra.
241. See text accompanying notes 216-233 supra.
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First, the level at which governmental growth control is currently occurring
is unrealistic and taints the entire controversy. To allow growth decisions at
the small town level not only enhances the possibility that such measures will
be used for discriminatory purposes, but also unjustifiably limits the course of
action open to municipal, state, and federal authorities in making more wideranging plans for alleviating or solving the population dispersal dilemma. In
most situations, not until states or metropolitan authorities, or both, tackle the
problem throughout their jurisdictions will restrictive measures be sufficiently
integrated with over-all economic, social, and general resource allocation policies to assure their compatibility with societal as opposed to local interests.
Second, it seems clear that no matter how needed or justifiable growth control measures are, they conflict with various constitutionally guaranteed rights
and freedoms - equal protection, protection of private property, and the right
to travel. As is always the case in such situations, careful balancing of interests
must occur to ensure that the benefits attained from such measures outweigh
the value of the rights and freedoms foregone to accomplish them.
Finally, new or at least different conceptual approaches to defining property rights and to reaching land use control decisions must be adopted. As discussed previously, 242 when it comes to defining ownership qualitatively, the
courts have spent too much time on novel ideas and extraneous issues 243 and
too little time in effectuating the social function theory of property rights.
With all due respect to those who have spent their time trying to avoid rather
than solve the problem of establishing the boundaries of the ownership right,
it must be recognized that planners have been slow in developing even partly
objective tools for analyzing the way in which a given tract of land should be
used. Even under competently conceived and administered master plans, land
use decisions have ordinarily been projected onto an imaginary plane of
"market demand" as separated from the land itself as the estates in land concept. Only quite recently has an approach that offers some degree of objectivity to the land use decision process been developed: the carrying capacity
244
theory.
The key focus of the carrying capacity approach is to concentrate on the
land itself - that is: "What is its highest and best use, not from a market demand viewpoint but from the standpoint of natural considerations - soil, water,
geological characteristics, topographical features, and the role it plays in its
natural state in the area's support systems? 245 An undeveloped area of Florida

242. See text accompanying notes 162-165 supra.
243. See notes 163-165 supra.
244. Perhaps the nexus of the theory lies in the concept that until the relatively recent
development of energy support techniques, the population of an area was limited by the
capacity of the natural system to support that area's inhabitants. See generally H. ODUM,
ENVIRONMENT, POWER AND SOCIETY

(1971), DEP'T or ARCHITECTURE, UNIV. OF FLA., INTERFACE

- 4, REPORT 4 URBAN DESIGN STUDIO (1974).
245. A modeling technique is used that involves the diagrammatic representation of
all the components and interactions of a given natural support system. Once diagrammed,
the model's behavior can be expressed in mathematical terms and "duplicated" on an analog
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now subject to intense development pressure has been analyzed in this manner. 248 The result has been the formulation of some objectively justifiable
estimates of the numbers of inhibitants the land can support without destruction of the natural support systems of the area. The use for which each tract
is best designed in order to make its maximum contribution to the area is also
ascertainable through this approach.
Computers, even if fed proper data obtained from this approach, obviously cannot decide land use cases. The data obtained, however, should be
extremely helpful to decisionmakers in assuring that population figures as well
as land use allocation decisions will be made in a more objective and land
oriented manner. If fundamental rights and ownership rights must be redefined to accomplish population growth control, then at least the latter must
relate to natural considerations inherent in ownership, rather than to a mere
shuffling of power between the private and public sectors of our society.

computer. The model may then be tested by inserting historical data, and checking to see
that the model generates data known to exist at present. In this way, the accuracy of the
model's ability to "predict" future trends may be validated. The value of working with such
a model is that by interjecting hypothetical changes in the system, the consequent effects on
the carrying capacity and future stability of the system can be reviewed and studied. Also,
by using such modeling techniques, a particular area can be studied to ascertain whether the
population growth has already exceeded the area's natural growth limits. See generally DEP'T
OF ARCHrrEcIETURE, UNIV. OF FLA., supra note 244.
246.

STATE CARRYING CAPACITY Coasmrrm, UNIV. OF FLA.,

FOR FLORIDA AND ITS MAJOR REGIONS INVOLVING NATURAL
HENSIVE PLANNING

CARRYING CAPACITY PROJECT

SYSTEMS INVENTORY

AND COMPRE-

(1974).
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